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Abstract
Individuals match on length and type of education. We investigate whether the
systematic relationship between educations of partners is explained by opportuni-
ties (e.g. low search frictions) or preferences (e.g. complementarities in household
production or portfolio optimization). We ￿nd that half of the systematic sorting
on education is due to low search frictions in marriage markets of the educational
institutions. The other half is attributed to complementarities in household pro-
duction, since income properties of the joint income process show no in￿ uence on
partner selection.
JEL codes: J12, J24.
Keywords: positive assortative matching on education, search frictions, hedging,
complementarities in household production.
￿Acknowledgement: Helena Skyt Nielsen thanks the Danish Research Agency for support. Michael
Svarer thanks the Danish National Research Foundation for support through its grant to CAM. We
are grateful to Julie Kracht, Maria Knoth Humlum and Ulla Nłrskov Nielsen for invaluable research
assistance, to Juanna Joensen, Rune Vejlin and Jonas Staghłj for useful comments and to Birgitte
Hłjklint for reading the manuscript. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors.
11 Introduction
There exists a substantial literature showing that individuals form partnerships with in-
dividuals with similar levels of education. The coe¢ cient of correlation between spousal
level of education is among the highest between di⁄erent personal characteristics.1 In a
recent study by Fernandez et al. (2005), the mean correlation is 0.6 based on information
from household surveys from 34 countries.
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the systematic relationship between
the educations of the partners is explained by opportunities or preferences.
In relation to the ￿rst explanation, educational institutions are presumably very e¢ -
cient marriage markets. The density of potential partners is rather high (see e.g. Goldin
(1992) and Lewis & Oppenheimer (2000)), and search frictions are therefore smaller than
in other local marriage markets (see e.g. Gautier et al. (2005) for a model that analyzes
the e⁄ect of search frictions on marriage market outcomes). That educational institutions
function as marriage markets is also rooted in sociology. In Scott (1965) and Blau and
Duncan (1967), it is argued that parents place their children in good colleges in order to
secure the social position of the family. There is also ample evidence that partnerships
form in schools. Laumann et al. (1994) report ￿based on a US survey conducted in 1992
￿that 23% of married couples met their current partner in school. In a Dutch Survey from
1995, 15% reported to have met their current partner in school (Kalmijn & Flap (2001)).
In fact, among the di⁄erent sets of shared settings (neighborhood, family overlap, work-
place etc.) the most common place for couples to meet before a partnership is initiated
at the same school. In the present analysis, which is based on Danish register-based data,
we ￿nd that for 20% of the couples the two partners have attended the same educational
institution.
It could also be the case that educational homogamy is the outcome of a decision
problem solved by rational agents. That is, an individual with a similar level, and perhaps
same type, of education might be preferred to an individual with a di⁄erent level of
education. In the following, we focus on two mechanisms for preference-based parthership
choice.
First, it might be the case that the mating of di⁄erent educational groupings occurs as
1Typically, individuals match positively on individuals traits. This is the case for e.g. income, height,
weight, IQ, and parents￿characteristics (see e.g. Epstein & Guttman (1984) and Schafer & Keith (1990)).
Besides age, education is the trait that has the highest bivariate correlation.
2a result of rational behavior of risk averse agents who seek to optimize discounted utility
in an environment where future income is uncertain. A number of papers highlight the
interdependence between risk sharing and marriage. In their seminal paper, Kotlikof &
Spivak (1981) showed that the expected gain that a risk averse agent can expect from
the risk sharing elements of marriage formation amounts to 10-20% of his wealth. Since
then, Rosenzweig & Stark (1989), Micevska (2002), Chen, Chiang & Leung (2003), and
Hess (2004), among others, have investigated related aspects of partnership formation
and dissolution in association with the presence of idiosyncratic income risk. The idea is
that risk averse agents can bene￿t from forming marriage with others to insure against
unforeseen changes in income. Along the lines of Hess (2004), a good economic match
has a high mean income, a low income volatility and an income process that negatively
correlates with ones own income process, much like a ￿nancial asset portfolio. In the
present analysis, we consider matching between individuals with di⁄erent educations. The
income variables are generated as time series means for di⁄erent educational groupings.
As a consequence, the income processes are exogenous to the speci￿c partnership, and we
implicitly assume that the agents are able to predict the future income components for
di⁄erent educational groups.
Second, it could also be the case that educational attainment of spouses are comple-
ments in the household production function. Becker (1973) argues that positive assor-
tative mating is optimal when traits are complements. According to this argument, a
reason why two partners with the same education form a partnership is that they tend
to appreciate the same public goods or the same kind of leisure. It is not obvious how
to identify to what extent educational traits are complements in the household produc-
tion function, although it is commonly assumed to be the case (see e.g. Chiappori et al.
(2006)). In a recent speed-dating experiment, Fisman et al. (2006) found no evidence of
preferences for same ￿eld of study. In the present analysis, we attribute the part of the
realized partnership formation between individuals that cannot be explained by oppor-
tunities (that is, proximity of partners) or by portfolio choices to complementarities in
household production.2
When it comes to dissolution of relationships, a systematic relationship between di-
vorce rates and education has also been established. In the divorce literature, it is typically
2There might be more mechanisms that imply systematic matching in education than the ones men-
tioned here. In the present analysis these will be considered to belong to the residual group and will
somewhat crudely be labeled complementarities in household production.
3found that level of education (i.e. the sum of years of education of the spouses) is more
important than similarity in education among spouses3 (see e.g. Weiss & Willis (1997),
Svarer (2004), and Charles & Stephens (2004)). More detailed information on the level
and type of education could be used to make inference about match quality. If the factors
related to education that in￿ uence partnership formation also in￿ uence dissolution risk,
there is presumably a systematic di⁄erence in match quality which is related to those fac-
tors. In order to reconcile the dissolution analysis with the partnership formation analysis
in a setup where we assume that decisions about whom to form a partnership with are
taken by rational and forward-looking individuals, there must be some disturbances to
the partnership that trigger dissolution. We will have this in mind when we present the
partnership dissolution analysis.
In this paper, we exploit a rich register data set to disentangle the correspondence
between education and marriage market behavior. We have detailed information on in-
dividuals￿educational attainment, including the exact type of education and where the
education was taken. After combining with information on individual income, we in-
vestigate to which extent educational portfolios of couples re￿ ect low search frictions,
complementarities in household productions and portfolio optimization. From a more
general perspective, the analysis allows us to evaluate whether the systematic relation-
ship between the educations of the partners is explained by opportunities (low search
frictions) or preferences (complementarities or portfolio optimization).
We ￿nd that half of the systematic sorting on education is due to low search frictions
in marriage markets of the educational institutions. The other half is attributed to com-
plementarities in household production, since income properties of joint income process
show no in￿ uence on partner selection. In addition, we ￿nd that dissolution risk is not
strongly a⁄ected by the factors that determine partnership choice. That is, although in-
dividuals are more likely to form a partnership with an individual who has attended the
same educational institution, the evidence that the distance a⁄ects the duration of the
relationship is rather weak.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In section 2, we describe the data set. In
section 3, we take a closer look at partnership formation. In section 4, we investigate the
process of partnership dissolution, and in section 5, we conclude.
3That is, in terms of lowering the divorce risk, it is better for a low educated individual to marry a
person with a high level of education rather than to marrying a person with a similar level of education .
42 Data
The data that we use to test our hypotheses come from IDA (Integrated Database for
Labour Market Research) created by Statistics Denmark. The information comes from
various administrative registers that are merged in Statistics Denmark. The IDA sample
used here contains (among other things) information on marriage market conditions for a
randomly drawn sub-sample of all individuals born between January 1, 1955 and January
1, 1965. The individuals are followed from 1980 to 1995. The data set enables us to
identify individual transitions between di⁄erent states of the marriage market on an annual
basis. In addition, we have information on a number of background characteristics for the
individuals as well as for their partners. Information on marriage market status is based
on a register that collects information on who is living in all housing units in Denmark.
This implies that an individual is registered as either cohabiting or married if they have
the same residential information as their partner. We are not able to identify relationships
between individuals who do not live together.
Below, we describe in detail how the data is organized and present the most important
statistics. First, we explain how we treat di⁄erent educations. Second, we describe how
income measures and distance measures are constructed.
2.1 Educational grouping
Throughout the paper, we assume that individuals ￿rst decide on where to pursue educa-
tion after they have ￿nished high school (typical graduation age is 18-19 years), and this is
also when they start to search in the marriage market. This assumption implies that edu-
cational grouping may be regarded as exogenous in the matching and dissolution analyses.
In order to comply with this assumption, we assign the ￿rst education an individual at-
tends after high school to the individual for the rest of the sample period. Individuals
who change education or drop out are assumed to belong to the educational group they
were ￿rst assigned to. We impose this restriction to reduce the presence of endogeneity
in choice of education. To the extent that individuals are already in a partnership when
they start the education, the assumption would be violated, since the decicion regarding
education and educational institution might be coordinated with the partner￿ s decision.
The available educational information gives a complete picture of an individual￿ s ed-
ucational history. Individuals are grouped according to the educational information. In
order to focus on colleges as marriage markets and educational homogamy, we restrict at-
5tention to high school graduates. Although this implies a substantial reduction in sample
size (see below), it enables us to give a very detailed description of partnership formation
and dissolution for individuals in partnerships where both partners have graduated from
high school. Generally, the intention is to group individuals into educational groups by
the ￿rst education they enrolled in after high school, as long as this is not an additional
high school education.
All individuals with educational information are then divided into 13 educational
groups4 which di⁄er in level and subject of education. In Table 1, we give an overview
of the sample reduction. The representative gross sample consists of 26,048 individuals
making up about 20,000 couples. When all relevant individuals have been assigned to one




Sample of individuals born 1955-1965 26,048
Relationships formed between 1980-1995 19,938
- where both partners completed high school 3,144
Partnership formation analysis
Relationships where information on institution and
municipality of education is available for both partners 2,965
Partnership dissolution analysis
Relationships formed before 1994 and
where information on institution and
municipality of education is available for both partners 2,896
Now we go through the de￿nition of educational groups in detail. The ￿rst group
consists of those individuals who do not enroll in an education after high school. The
remaining 12 groups then consist of individuals who enroll in one of the following edu-
cations: vocational education and training, short-cycle higher education, medium-cycle
higher education and long-cycle higher education. Individuals who enroll in vocational
education and training are subdivided into two groups where one consists of the mer-
cantile educations, such as sales assistants, and the other consists of both crafts, such as
electricians or plumbers, and health or pedagogical-related educations, e.g. orthopedists.
The short-cycle higher educations are all grouped together and are subject-wise more
4The number of educational groups are restricted by the number of individuals in each group. We
have tried to form groups that are as homogenous as possible while still having a su¢ cient number of
observations to calculate the desired statistics.
6diverse than the other groups. Examples of short-cycle higher educations are real estate
agents and various forms of technicians.
Individuals who enroll in medium-cycle higher educations are subdivided into ￿ve
groups. The ￿rst group consists of pedagogical educations, such as nursery teachers and
social workers. The second group comprises school teachers at the basic and lower sec-
ondary level. The third group consists of educations that lead to jobs in the public
health system, e.g. nurses and physical therapists. The fourth group consists of educa-
tional subjects within the range of humanities and business, e.g. journalists, librarians,
and graduate diplomas in business administration. The ￿nal group comprises technical,
veterinary, agricultural, and military educations, e.g. engineers.
Finally, individuals who enroll in long-cycle higher educations are divided into four
groups: the humanities, the natural and technical sciences, the social sciences, and the
medical sciences. These are university educations. In Table 2, the distribution of males
and females across educational groups are presented.
From Table 2, we see that women are overrepresented in educational groups that
contain social and pedagogical and health care elements, whereas men are more inclined
to take an education in natural sciences, technical, veterinary and agricultural sciences,
and social sciences.
Table 2
Educational groups, number of observations
Education group Men Women
(1) No further education than high-school 208 181
(2) Vocational - mercantile 206 262
(3) Vocational - health and crafts 152 136
(4) Short-cycle further education 142 280
Medium-cycle further education
(5) Social and pedagogical 44 199
(6) School teacher 218 262
(7) Health care 39 440
(8) Humanities and social sciences 51 64
(9) Technical, veterinary and agricultural sciences 377 81
Long-cycle further education
(10) Humanities 218 332
(11) Natural and technical sciences 590 250
(12) Social sciences 547 331
(13) Medical sciences 173 147
In total 2965 2965
In Table 3, we report the ratio of actual to expected frequency of a given educational
combination in order to get an overview of the educational combinations of couples. The
expected frequency is the number of couples in a given cell had the matching been random
7by education.5 For instance, for couples within medical sciences (combination 13-13,
see Table 2), the expected frequency would be 8.58 (147*173/2965), whereas the actual
frequency is 33 couples; this makes up a ratio of 3.85 (33/8.58). Ratios above 1 are
highlighted, and they represent educational combinations that are more common than
would be the case under random matching by education.
A pattern of positive assortative matching on education shows up. All couples with
the same education (i.e. at the diagonal) are systematically more common.6 However,
there are large di⁄erences between the tendency of homogamous marriage. In Appendix
A, Table A1, we show the ranking of couples by ratio. The top three couples are social
and pedagogical couples, teacher couples and medical science couples. The ￿rst ten places
on the ranking are occupied by couples with the same educations. Among the couples
that do not consist of people with similar educational attainment, the more popular are,
as expected: female nurses who mix up with male medical doctors (rank 19).
5Note that the expected frequencies are calculated based on the numbers in Table 2 and not on the
marginal distributions for the whole of Denmark.
6Couples on the diagonal make up 22% of all couples, whereas couples with the same length of
education amount to 43% of all couples in our sample.
8Table 3
Ratios of actual to expected frequency
Females
Males 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 2:49 1:47 1:96 0:88 1:08 0:72 1:00 0:50 0:93 0:65 0:39 0:53 0:59
2 1:69 3:06 0:82 1:12 0:79 0:67 0:60 0:35 0:42 0:51 0:45 0:79 0:61
3 1:92 1:07 1:32 1:36 1:42 0:83 0:94 1:56 0:25 1:16 0:40 0:43 0:55
4 1:54 1:13 1:39 2:72 0:96 0:71 0:90 0:00 1:05 0:51 0:51 0:58 0:43
5 0:32 0:66 0:51 0:50 6:69 1:30 1:09 0:00 0:00 1:27 0:00 0:00 0:00
6 0:38 0:26 0:52 0:70 1:85 4:53 0:91 1:31 0:52 0:55 0:28 0:56 0:58
7 0:00 0:49 1:73 0:28 0:00 0:88 2:98 1:22 0:97 0:72 0:63 1:44 0:00
8 0:55 0:38 0:44 0:43 2:13 0:23 2:28 2:80 0:74 1:28 0:96 0:74 0:00
9 0:83 1:34 0:93 0:93 0:80 0:74 1:30 0:74 3:61 0:79 0:82 0:65 0:76
10 0:63 0:17 1:02 0:55 0:98 1:04 0:68 2:37 0:17 2:69 1:00 1:02 1:14
11 0:49 0:64 0:98 1:06 0:60 0:77 0:90 0:88 1:14 1:03 2:32 1:04 1:26
12 0:96 0:74 0:93 0:93 0:81 0:72 0:80 1:20 0:27 1:12 0:91 2:06 1:02
13 0:24 0:44 0:26 0:82 0:71 0:33 1:73 1:10 0:65 0:91 1:20 0:97 3:85
Note: Bold indicates that the actual frequency is higher than the expected frequency.
The empirical analysis that follows is going to shed more light on the reasons for
positive assortative matching and other systematic matching patterns on education. The
next two subsections present the variables needed to test whether partnership formation
happens due to preferences or opportunities or both. First, we de￿ne variables that
describe the couples￿income processes. Second, we present variables that measure the
search costs for matching with a speci￿c educational type.
2.1.1 Income measures
To assess whether a given portfolio of two educations ful￿lls the requirement of being a
good economic match, we calculate a number of simple income measures based on the
time series variation in incomes between di⁄erent educational groups. We base the income
measures on income information sampled over educational groupings instead of using data
from observed partnerships. The latter su⁄ers from potential endogeneity bias (see e.g
Hess (2004)). Along the lines of Hess (2004), we present three narrowly de￿ned income
measures: income correlation, relative volatilities, and mean di⁄erence to describe the
income processes in relationships within di⁄erent educational groupings. In addition, we
summarize the characteristics of the income processes of two partners given educations
by the standardized return.
The income measures are based on residuals from a Mincer wage regression of log net
income on experience and experience squared. The residual purges wages for di⁄erences
stemming from systematic experience di⁄erences between educational groups.
9Based on the residuals, we compute the correlation between partners￿income residuals
as a pooled time series correlation. More speci￿cally, for a man in educational group i
and a woman in educational group j, the correlation is de￿ned as the correlation over
time between the mean income residuals of men in educational group i and women in
educational group j. All income measures are per de￿nition the same for any couple with
the same educational combination. Similarly, the income gap is de￿ned as jyi ￿ yjj and







; where yi;yj are the mean income residuals
for groups i and j; and ￿j;￿i are the standard deviation of the mean income residuals for
groups i and j:
The standardized return is computed as the sum of the mean residuals for a couple
divided by the standard deviation on the sum of residuals. Due to the similarity with
the return to a ￿nancial portfolio, we denote the standardized return the ￿ Sharpe￿ratio.
I.e. for a man in educational group i and a woman in educational group j, the Sharpe
ratio is the sum of the mean income residual for groups i and j divided by the standard
deviation of the sum of the two mean income residuals. This ratio measures the mean
income residual per unit of variability, meaning that this measure indicates how good the
partnership between two individuals is in terms of generating a certain income level.
In terms of de￿ning a good portfolio of educations in marriage, individuals should
seek to form partnership with individuals who have education that gives a high mean, low
variance and a negative correlation. Focusing on the summary measure, individuals should
seek partners with a high Sharpe ratio. In Table 4, we report the estimated correlation
and Sharpe ratios for the 13*13 educational mating possibilities. Looking across the
diagonal elements, we see positive correlations for 11 out of 13 educational groupings.
Also, the Sharpe ratios are relatively modest (except for couples where both studied
medical science after high school and couples where both have mercantile vocational
training). This pattern tentatively suggests that ￿nding a good economic match is not
the main determinant for observed partnership formation.
2.1.2 Distance measures
To investigate how search costs a⁄ect marriage market behavior, we include a variety of
distance measures between educational groups in the analysis. The basic idea is that
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11the institutions at which the particular education is started, should generate more intra-
educational matching since it is cheaper to locate a suitable partner.
Three di⁄erent measures of distance between the partners are used. The ￿rst measure
is the minimum geographic distance (minimum distance) from e.g. a man￿ s actual place of
education to a woman in educational group j. The second measure is the density (density)
of women in educational group j in the man￿ s municipality of education in the year he
enrolls in the education. The third is a simple indicator of whether or not the spouses
have attained their education at the same educational institution (same institution).
In calculating the ￿rst two distance measures, we use all educational information
available, not only on the individuals in the 2,965 couples, but on all high school graduates
in the sample. On the basis of this educational information, we determine the minimum
distance that you would be required to travel from any municipality in Denmark to ￿nd
an individual of educational group i, assuming that e.g. individuals from educational
group i are only to be found at their municipality of education. For a couple where the
man has taken his education in a municipality m and the woman is in educational group
i; the minimum distance is de￿ned as follows: the distance between municipality m and
the nearest municipality where women in educational group i are educated. However,
the minimum distance to individuals in educational group 1 is assumed to be zero, which
means that all individuals are assumed to be close to individuals from this educational
group since high schools are spread out over the entire country.
The density is a measure of the concentration of di⁄erent educational groups in the
municipalities. It measures the density of individuals from a speci￿c educational group
in a speci￿c municipality. For a man who has taken his education in municipality m and
who enrolled in year t, and whose partner belongs to educational group i; the density is
de￿ned as the proportion of women in municipality m from educational group i in year t.
The third distance measure is simply an indicator for whether or not the two partners
attended the same educational institution.
Descriptive statistics for the distance measures are presented in Table 5 for the part-
nership formation analysis, and in Table 7 for the partnership dissolution analysis. The
distance measures are proxies for search cost of ￿nding a partner with a given level of
education since we do not know if a given partnership is formed because the couple met
in school. It could also be the case that the reason why we ￿nd substantial homogamy
in terms of education is that people with similar types of education share the same work-
places after graduation. After school, the workplace is the most likely place to meet a
12marriage partner according to both Laumann et al. (1994) and Kalmijn & Flap (2001).
We address the latter issue in the following section where we perform a multivariate
analysis of partnership formation.
3 Partnership formation analysis
Below, we investigate how economic conditions and accessibility of partners a⁄ect part-
nership formation. The question we try to answer is: Do positive assortative matching in
education persist when we control for proximity of partners and economic factors?
To answer this, we follow the empirical strategy of Dalmia & Lawrence (2001) and
Jepsen & Jepsen (2002). They both use conditional logit models to compare actual couples
with randomly created couples to see if actual couples are more similar or more di⁄erent
than the random pairings.
The empirical procedure works as follows: In the ￿rst step, the relevant explanatory
variables are de￿ned. In this application we include: age di⁄erence between partners,
an indicator for whether they attend the same education, characteristics of the income
residuals for the educational grouping of partners, distance measures between partners￿
educational institutions, an indicator variable for whether the partner attended the same
educational institution, and a density measure of the partners￿educational group in the
local area. In the second step, the randomly created couples are generated. These are
created by randomly assigning an individual from the pool of available partners to a
given person (we do not construct same sex couples).7 The ￿nal step is to predict the sign
of the coe¢ cients based on the level of positive or negative assortative matching. The
conditional logit model is:




where i is an individual, j is an alternative, and xij is the vector of characteristics of the
couple created by matching person i with an alternative j. Letting the dependent variable
take the value 1 for a natural couple and 0 for an arti￿cial couple, we expect to ￿nd a
negative coe¢ cient to the age di⁄erence, since positive assortative matching means that
7We only construct one arti￿cal match for each couple. Jepsen & Jepsen (2002) also used 1, but state
that sensitivity analysis where 3 arti￿cial partners were constructed did not alter their results. In addition,
McFadden (1973) shows that the conditional logit model produces consistent parameter estimates when
a random subset of nonchosen alternatives is used.
13the age di⁄erence should be smaller for actual couples than for arti￿cial couples. Likewise,
if a couple is more likely to form if the partners share the same educational institution,
the coe¢ cient to same institution should be positive. We assume in the following that
the explanatory variables are exogenous to the partnership formation process.
In Table 5, we present descriptive statistics for the information used in the matching
analysis.
Table 5
Descriptive statistics for variables used in matching analysis
Real couples Constructed couples
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. Dev
Correlation 0.2608 0.3530 0.2313 0.3613
Sharpe ratio -0.0694 0.5007 -0.0657 0.4815
Age di⁄erence (years) 2.8169 2.5666 5.3339 4.0127
Income gap 0.2305 0.1922 0.2447 0.1870
Variance gap 0.4500 0.2443 0.4577 0.2561
Same institution 0.2037 0.4028 0.0314 0.1743
Density 0.1382 0.1711 0.0961 0.1209
Minimum distance (km) 4.2371 14.4948 6.7450 19.1628
# observations 2,965 2,965
The ￿rst columns show the mean and standard deviation for the explanatory vari-
ables for the 2965 couples in the sample. Around 20% of the couples attended the same
educational institution. This does not necessarily imply that they meet at the time of
education, but it strongly suggests that educational institutions do provide facilities for
partnership search.8 For the minimum distance variable it is crucial to know that for men
(women) 60% (70%) begin an education in one of the major cities in Denmark. Here all
13 educational groupings are available, and as a consequence, for 85% of the couples this
variable equals 0.
In Table 6, we present the results from the conditional logit model for partnership
formation.
8Unfortunately, our register-based data set does not allow any identi￿cation of where the couples
actually meet.
14table 6
results for partnership formation analysis
Speci￿cation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Age di⁄erence (years) -0.2621* -0.2578* -0.2568* -0.2622* -0.2623* -0.2611* -0.2327*
(0.0117) (0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0122) (0.0128)
[￿0:0542] [￿0:0458] [￿0:0493] [￿0:0541] [￿0:0563] [￿0:0573] [￿0:0522]
Same educational group 1.2678* 1.2691* 1.2770* 0.6022* 0.3941*
(0.0989) (0.0989) (0.1034) (0.1202) (0.1281)
[0:2940] [0:2940] [0:3010] [0:1400] [0:0918]
Income measures
Correlation 0.2485* 0.1849* 0.1062 -0.0268
(0.0906) (0.0936) (0.0972) (0.1097)
[0:0442] [0:0397] [0:0233] [￿0:0060]
Income gap -0.5458* 0.1436 -0.0257 0.1480
(0.1808) (0.1955) (0.2070) (0.2241)
[￿0:0970] [0:0308] [￿0:0056] [0:0332]
Variance gap -0.1816 0.0275 -0.1560 -0.1275
(0.1396) (0.1451) (0.1543) (0.1690)





Minimum distance (km) -0.0055* -0.0084*
(0.0022) (0.0025)
[￿0:0012] [￿0:0019]






Number of couples 2,965 2,390
Note: For each variable we present the estimated coe¢ cient, the standard error (in parentheses), and the
marginal e⁄ect [in brackets]. * indicates signi￿cance at the 5% level. Speci￿cation 7 includes only
those couples who did not attend the same high school.
15In all speci￿cations, we ￿nd that a lower age di⁄erence between two individuals in-
creases the probability that they form a partnership. This pattern is as expected and in
accordance with the marriage formation literature that ￿nds strong positive assortative
mating in age.
In the ￿rst speci￿cation, we add to the age di⁄erence an indicator for whether the
partners have the same education. We ￿nd that when choosing among two otherwise
identical partners, the probability of choosing the one with the same education as ones
own is 29 percentage points higher. This conforms with the patterns of positive assortative
matching on education, which we saw in the previous subsection and which is well-known
in the literature. The estimated marginal e⁄ect is una⁄ected by including income re-
lated variables (speci￿cations 2-5). However, it is approximately halved when proximity
of partners is controlled for, indicating that half of the positive assortative mating on
education is explained by low search costs at educational institutions.9 The other half is
attributed to complementarities in household production.
In the second and third speci￿cations, we include only income related variables. We
see that the mean income gap has a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect, which disappears in speci￿-
cation 4 and 5, whereas the variance gaps do not have a statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient.
That is, there is no evidence suggesting that individuals choose partners who have edu-
cational attainment that makes their expected income streams negatively correlated. In
fact, the opposite seems to be the case. The more correlated the income residuals for the
educational groups are, the more likely is it that a match is made, which most likely indi-
cates omitted variable bias. Also, the possibility of forming a partnership with a person
with whom it is possible to construct a high yield return corrected for variability does
not seem to drive partnership formation either. These ￿ndings could suggest that either
individuals do not pay attention to these considerations when they form partnerships,
or that they simply do not have the su¢ cient information to judge whether a potential
partner o⁄ers a good hedge and a high variance-corrected return.
In speci￿cation 6, we include variables capturing the proximity of partners. We ￿nd
that the e⁄ect from income correlation becomes insigni￿cant at conventional levels of
signi￿cance. So the ￿nding that individuals with higher positively correlated income
9We also estimated a version of the model where we exclude couples that worked at the same workplace
the year before marriage, and then the marginal e⁄ect is further reduced to 11 percentage points. Hence,
a small part of assortative matching on education is due to the fact that people with the same educations
are more likely to meet at their workplace than others.
16processes are more likely to marry seems to follow from their closer proximity while
undertaking education. This conjecture is consistent with the ￿nding that the included
proximity variables all have a signi￿cant in￿ uence on partnership formation and that
the e⁄ects are working in the expected direction. That is, an individual is more likely
to form partnership with a person who, after high-school, attends the same educational
institution (e.g. the same university or the same business school). The marginal e⁄ect
of the indicator variable is rather high, indicating that the probability for a match is
raised by 45 percentage points if two persons share educational institution.10 Also, we
￿nd that the higher density of partners with a given education increases the likelihood
that an individual forms partnership with a person with this educational attainment, and
￿nally, we also ￿nd that the smaller the minimum distance from e.g. a man￿ s educational
institution to a given woman￿ s educational institution, the more likely is it that they form
a partnership. A ten kilometer extra distance reduces the probability of marriage by 1.2
percentage points.
Around 20% of the couples also attended the same high school. If they already started
to date at this time and subsequently coordinated their choices of where to pursue fur-
ther education, the distance measures might be endogenous to the partnership formation
process (at least for those who continued the relationship after they started further educa-
tion). To address this issue, we exclude all couples who attended the same high school in
speci￿cation 7. If endogeneity were a major concern, we would expect that the co¢ cients
to the distance variables were biased away from zero. For the reduced sample it turns out
that the minimum distance e⁄ect actually becomes stronger. Hence, this does not suggest
that this variable is upward-biased in speci￿cation 6. The density and same institution
variables show a somewhat smaller e⁄ect in speci￿cation 7, but the change is very modest.
Consequently, we do not think that the inclusion of individuals who attended the same
high school is a major problem, and we rely on speci￿cation 6 for the main conclusion of
this part of the paper.11
In Table A2 in Appendix A, we present results for a conditional logit model with indi-
cator variables for educational cross terms of couples. First, we estimate the conditional
logit model with 13*13 cell indicators, and then we test down using a 5% signi￿cance
10Strictly speaking, they do not have to meet each other at the institution since there are no time
limitations to when they enrolled and graduated
11We also tried to exclude couples who formed the relationship before they entered college (roughly 500
couples). In this case, the main conclusions are unchanged although the variance gap becomes signi￿cant.
17level. This procedure leaves us with 17 indicators for education cells. The pattern shows
positive assortative matching on education with a few exceptions. However, there is some
variation in the size of the estimated e⁄ects; marginal e⁄ects range from 13 to 57 per-
centage points. As before, we ￿nd that including income related variables leaves the
coe¢ cients literally una⁄ected. The only exceptions are couples of females with voca-
tional mercantile education (2) and males with vocational health and crafts education (3)
or further education in the social sciences (12), which goes down after including income
variables. However, when we control for proximity of partners, we see that more than half
of the indicators referring to diagonal cells go down and become insigni￿cant, while for a
few of the frequent o⁄-diagonal couples, the marginal e⁄ect goes up, e.g. for couples of
nurses and medical doctors (7-13), it goes up from 10 to 17 percentage points. The con-
clusion from the conditional logits with indicators for education cells generally con￿rms
the above. However, it allows us to name some couples who seem to appreciate the same
public goods, that is, couples with a vocational mercantile education (2-2), couples with
further education in the humanities (10-10), couples with further education in medical
sciences (13-13) and nurses and medical doctors (7-13).
All in all, the partnership formation analysis suggests that search costs are indeed
important for partnership formation and that individuals apparently search in marriage
markets that are close to the place where they attend school. A main conclusion from this
matching analysis is that we ￿nd a clear pattern of assortative matching on education,
and half of that stems from low search costs for partners at the educational institutions.
Another important conclusion is that we ￿nd no evidence suggesting that economic con-
ditions are important.
4 Partnership dissolution analysis12
The next step is to analyze what e⁄ects the main variables: economic conditions and
proximity of partners, have on the duration of relationships. In order to investigate this,
we estimate a duration model where the random variable is the time spent in a given
relationship. More speci￿cally, we sample all partnerships that are formed during the
period of observation and follow them until they dissolve or the sampling period ends. In
the latter case, the observations are treated as right censored. This procedure gives a ￿ ow
12Since we focus on both cohabiting relationships and formal marriages, a split-up will henceforth be
denoted a dissolution.
18sample of partnership. The duration model is speci￿ed as a mixed proportional hazard
model. That is, it is a product of a function of time spent in the relationship (the baseline
hazard), observed time-varying characteristics, x, and unobserved characteristics, v :
h(tjxt;v) = ￿(t) ￿ ’(xt;v); (1)
where ￿(t) is the baseline hazard and ’(xt;v) is the scaling function speci￿ed as exp(x0
t￿+
v).
Since we only observe the transitions on the marriage market on a yearly basis, we
specify a model for grouped duration data (see e.g. Kiefer (1990)). The marriage duration
T is observed to lie in one of K intervals, with the k￿ th interval being (tk￿1;tk] and the
convention t0 = 0 for k = 1;:::;15. The probability that the duration T for an individual
with explanatory variables xt is greater than tk given that the duration is greater than
tk￿1 is given by:










tk￿1 ￿i(t)dt. The interval-speci￿c survivor expression (2) is henceforth
denoted ￿k: The probability of observing an exit out of marriage in interval k; conditional
on survival until T > tk￿1; is consequently 1 ￿ ￿k. If we do not specify a functional form
for the baseline hazard, the ￿i;ks are just parameters to be estimated.










where g(v) is the probability density function of the unobservables and where j = 1 if
the marriage is not right censored and 0 otherwise. Uncompleted durations therefore only
contribute with the survivor probabilities. g(v) is assumed to follow a discrete distribution
with two points of support.
In addition to information on educational attainment and the associated income mea-
sure as well as distance measures, we use a range of other explanatory variables in this
part of the analysis.13 We have three time-varying indicator variables for the presence
13The choice of explanatory variables is decided partly by what is available in the data set and partly
by what is typically used as explanatory variables in the empirical divorce literature (see e.g. Becker et
al. (1979) and Svarer (2004)).
19of children. These are ￿rst child, second child and third+ children. Since formal mar-
riages in general are more stable, we also distinguish between cohabiting relationships
and marriages by the indicator married. A variable indicating the order of relationship
the individual currently occupies is measured by the relationship number variable. This
takes the value 1, if it is the ￿rst relationship in which the unit of observation is regis-
tered. Subsequent relationships with di⁄erent partners raise this number. We also include
variables measuring the age of the partners in the couple and the age di⁄erence. The vari-
able, sickness, is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the individual receives sickness
bene￿ts for at least 13 weeks during the year. We also distinguish between individuals
living in the Copenhagen metropolitan area and individuals living in the provinces by the
indicator variable province. We include each individual￿ s annual degree of unemployment.
This variable is de￿ned as the number of hours of unemployment divided by the number
of potential supplied working hours.
20In Table 7, we present descriptive statistics for the variables used in the dissolution
equation.
Table 7
Descriptive statistics for dissolution model at time of partnership formation
Mean Std. Dev.
Same educational group 0.2082 0.4061
Sharpe -0.0663 0.4988
Income gap 0.2288 0.1904
Variance gap 0.4503 0.2440
Correlation 0.2648 0.3558
Minimum distance (km) 4.2103 14.5468
Density 0.1395 0.1733
Same institution 0.2017 0.4013
Married 0.0970 0.2961
Relationship number 1.3222 0.6143
Living outside Copenhagen 0.4858 0.4999
Children (measured at ￿nal year of observation)
First 0.5007 0.5001
Second 0.2724 0.4453
Third + 0.0466 0.2109
Age
Female between 15-20 0.6095 0.4880
Female between 21-25 0.3111 0.4630
Female between 26-30 0.0687 0.2530
Male between 15-20 0.4492 0.4975
Male between 21-25 0.3809 0.4857
Male between 26-30 0.1395 0.3465
Female more than 4 years older 0.0297 0.1698
Male more than 4 years older 0.1775 0.3821
Sickness and unemployment
Sickness, female 0.0508 0.2195
Sickness, male 0.0404 0.1969
Unemployment degree, female 0.0679 0.1742
Unemployment degree, male 0.0672 0.1753
Number of observations 16,169
Number of partnerships 2,896
Mean duration 6.5832
Dissolutions 0.3809
Note that the income measures are derived from the educational belongings of the
couples. They do not represent the realized income during partnerships. In this sense,
the income measures are exogenous to the dissolution process.
In Table 8, the results from the dissolution model are presented. The ￿rst speci￿cation
contains the three income measures, the second speci￿cation uses the standardized return,
and the third excludes the density and same institution variables from speci￿cation 1.14
14We have estimated various versions of the model including di⁄erent explanatory variables and in
sequential order. The main results are robust to these di⁄erent con￿gurations. We therefore only present
the model with all explanatory variables included.
21Table 8
results for partnership dissolution model
1 2 3
Coe⁄. S.E. Coe⁄. S.E. Coe⁄. S.E
Same educational group -0.0453 0.0977 -0.1304 0.0934 0.0143 0.0847
Correlation -0.0110 0.0894 -0.0079 0.0894
Income gap 0.6236￿￿ 0.1698 0.6201￿￿ 0.1703
Variance gap -0.1803 0.1331 -0.1615 0.1321
Sharpe -0.3744￿￿ 0.0621
Minimum distance (km) -0.0404 0.0260 -0.0380 0.0254 -0.0460￿ 0.0256
Same institution 0.1011 0.0901 0.0625 0.0901
Density 0.1262 0.2001 0.1477 0.2018
Married -1.4408￿￿ 0.1238 -1.4266￿￿ 0.1238 -1.4367￿￿ 0.1238
Relationship number 0.1811￿￿ 0.0648 0.1993￿￿ 0.0633 0.1839￿￿ 0.0645
Living outside Copenhagen -0.1904￿￿ 0.0644 -0.1856￿￿ 0.0646 -0.1796￿￿ 0.0641
Children
First -0.8078￿￿ 0.1337 -0.8358￿￿ 0.1338 -0.8221￿￿ 0.1338
Second 0.4066￿￿ 0.2004 0.4543￿￿ 0.2005 0.4112￿￿ 0.2002
Third + 0.3676 0.4213 0.3862 0.4218 0.3701 0.4218
Age
Female between 15-20 0.0465 0.2393 0.0777 0.2388 0.0097 0.2391
Female between 21-25 -0.0697 0.2133 -0.0556 0.2126 -0.0964 0.2130
Female between 26-30 -0.2001 0.1970 -0.2069 0.1959 -0.2236 0.1969
Male between 15-20 0.6229￿￿ 0.2054 0.6579￿￿ 0.2065 0.6513￿￿ 0.2055
Male between 21-25 0.2070 0.1711 0.2359 0.1715 0.2225 0.1711
Male between 26-30 -0.0115 0.1476 -0.0021 0.1480 -0.0071 0.1476
Female more than 4 years older 0.4760￿￿ 0.2014 0.5129￿￿ 0.2021 0.4490￿￿ 0.2010
Male more than 4 years older 0.3999￿￿ 0.1063 0.4159￿￿ 0.1070 0.4022￿￿ 0.1064
Sickness and unemployment
Sickness, female -0.1028 0.1283 -0.1065 0.1287 -0.0875 0.1284
Sickness, male -0.1673 0.1586 -0.1724 0.1595 -0.1589 0.1586
Unemployment degree, female 0.0163 0.1643 -0.0263 0.1651 0.0154 0.1644
Unemployment degree, male 0.5462￿￿ 0.1614 0.4832￿￿ 0.1621 0.5456￿￿ 0.1617
Number of observations 16,169 16,169 16,169
Log-likelihood -3,377 -3,366 -3378
Note: ￿ (￿￿) denotes signi￿cance at the 10 (5) % level.
The variables of main interest in Table 8 are the economic conditions variables and the
proximity between partners￿educational institutions. We saw in Table 6 that proximity of
educational institutions had signi￿cant in￿ uence on partnership formation. We attributed
this to lower search costs. The ￿nding that individuals are more likely to form partnership
with individuals who are more easily accessible could result in lower quality partnerships
if individuals were less choosy in the local marriage market. The results presented suggest
that this e⁄ect is rather weak and that it is dominated by the e⁄ect of a high arrival of
o⁄ers from partners in the local marriage market. In speci￿cation 3, we show that the
minimum distance variable has a marginal negative e⁄ect on the dissolution risk. This
suggests that couples who began education after high school at institutions that were far
away from each other have a lower risk of dissolution. This e⁄ect is only signi￿cant at
the 8% level though. The other proximity variables are far from signi￿cant. In addition,
22couples from the same educational groups do not have higher or lower risk of divorce than
couples who started at di⁄erent types of education.15 In terms of the very pronounced
results from the partnership formation analysis it is somewhat surprising that we do not
￿nd that these relationships are more stable. The result does not, however, contradict
previous studies in the divorce literature. Here, it is typically found that level of education
(i.e. the sum of years of education between spouses) is more important than similarity in
education among spouses (see e.g. Weiss & Willis (1997), Svarer (2004), and Charles &
Stephens (2004)).
The estimates for the economic conditions variables are in accordance with expecta-
tions. Couples who have a higher sharpe ratio are more likely to have longer relationships.
This suggests that ￿nancially better partnerships are more likely to last. In essence, this
is consistent with the divorce literature that typically ￿nds that couples who are econom-
ically well o⁄have a lower divorce risk (see e.g. Weiss & Willis (1997), B￿heim & Ermish
(2001), and Svarer (2004)). The coe¢ cient for income correlation is far from signi￿cant
and does not support the hypothesis that partnerships based on economic hedging are
more likely to endure.16 Together with the observation that larger income gaps are asso-
ciated with a higher dissolution risk this suggests that it is a high common income level
that is good for the stability of relationships.
Assuming that the length of a relationship carries some information on the quality of
the relationship, why do individuals then match with individuals who have the same level
of education when it does not prolong the duration of the partnership?
We do ￿nd that the further away the educational institutions are, the longer the
relationships last. This association is rather weak and also not robust to inclusion of
additional distance measures (see speci￿cation 1 and 2 in Table 8). Also, individuals
do not match based on economic return criteria. Although educational groupings that
generate a higher expected standardized return (as measured by the Sharpe ratio) are
more stable, this does not have any in￿ uence on partnership formation. It is hard to
15In Table A3 in the appendix, we estimate a version of the dissolution model where we include dummy
variables for the educational groupings that were signi￿cant in the partnership formation analysis. Non
of these turn out to have signi￿cant coe¢ cients either.
16Hess (2004) found that couples with more positively correlated income processes were more likely to
split up. We also estimated a version of the model where we use realized income correlations between
the two partners. For the complete sample (including individuals with less than high school as well) we
￿nd that more correlated income processes are associated with higher dissolution risk. In that sense the
data set corroborates Hess (2004).
23reconcile these ￿ndings with a model that addresses partnership choice as an outcome of
utility maximizing behavior by rational agents. In terms of modeling dissolution processes,
it is useful to allow for some ex-post heterogeneity in the quality of the partnership. This
can be done either along the lines of Becker et al. (1977), who argue that it is deviation
between expected and realized utilities that trigger divorce, or as approached in Brien et
al. (2006) where it is assumed that match quality is an experienced good. In the latter
model, the match quality is a random variable, and the realization observed in the ￿rst
period is only a noisy signal of what future draws from the distribution of match quality
bring. In relation to these theories of divorce, there is nothing in our analysis that suggests
that couples that are similar in terms of educational attainment are more or less likely to
survive a shock to the relationship or that they are more able to form expectation on the
future match quality of their relationship.
In a recent contribution to the divorce literature, Hess (2004) incorporates love into
a model of partnership choice and dissolution. He argues that if love and economic
conditions are substitutes (and additive separable) in the utility function, then couples
who form a bad match, perhaps due to a low Sharpe ratio (formulated in the terms used
in the present paper), or have a high positive income correlation might still ￿nd it optimal
to form a partnership if love is su¢ ciently high. When time moves along and if love is
temporary (which Hess (2004) heroically concludes) then the latter types of couples fall
short of value to their partnership, and it becomes optimal to dissolve the partnership.
The ￿ndings presented in Table 6 and Table 8 are to some extent consistent with Hess￿ s
(2004) ￿ndings. That is, couples formed between educational groupings that generate a
low Sharpe ratio are not less likely to form, but less likely to endure. This suggests that
these partnerships have a lot of initial love. Unfortunately for them, love is temporary
and the payo⁄ to the relationship decreases with the length of the relationship.17
The e⁄ects of the other explanatory variables in Table 8 and A3 are in accordance
with previous results found in the divorce literature (see Svarer (2004, 2005) for a separate
discussion of the these e⁄ects).
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we take a closer look at the observation that individuals tend to match on
length and type of education. We investigate whether the systematic relationship between
17The same line of argumentation can be made for the income gap variable.
24the educations of the partners is explained by opportunities, e.g. low search frictions, or
preferences, e. g. complementarities in household production or portfolio optimization.
We ￿nd that around half of the systematic sorting on education is due to low search
frictions in marriage markets of the educational institutions. The other half is attributed
to complementarities in household production since income properties of joint income
process show no in￿ uence on partner selection.
When it comes to explaining dissolution risk we do not ￿nd that couples who share the
same education are more or less likely to split up than couples who have di⁄erent types
or levels of education. We do, however, ￿nd that individuals who form partnership with
individuals from an educational group that generates a high standardized economic return
are more likely to have a long-lived relationship. Interestingly, these types of partnership
are not more likely to form than couples generated by random matching.
For future research it could be fruitful to develop a theoretical justi￿cation of the
empirical results presented in this paper. Hess (2004) provides a model that is consistent
with some of the ￿ndings we present, but it does not address the issue of proximity of
partners which constitutes one of the main mechanisms for partnership formation.
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Table A1










1 5 5 6:69
2 6 6 4:53
3 13 13 3:85
4 9 9 3:61
5 2 2 3:06
6 7 7 2:98
7 8 8 2:80
8 4 4 2:72
9 10 10 2:69
10 1 1 2:49
11 8 10 2:37
12 11 11 2:32
13 7 8 2:28
14 5 8 2:13
15 12 12 2:06
16 3 1 1:96
17 1 3 1:92
18 5 6 1:85
19 7 13 1:73
20 3 7 1:73
29Table A2: Results from conditional logit model
Speci￿cation
Educational groups (female-male) 1￿ 4￿ 5￿ 6￿
1-1 0.9727* 0.9733* 0.8789* 0.5433
(0.3925) (0.3925) (0.3970) (0.4147)
[ 0:2306] [0:2308 ] [0:2099] [0:1287]
1-3 0.8073 0.8071 0.7634 0.7205
(0.4410) (0.4414) (0.4470) (0.4517)
[0:1895] [0:1895] [0:1812] [ 0:1729]
2-1 0.7582 0.7650 0.6848 0.4149
(0.4021) (0.4031) (0.4045) (0.4413)
[0:1771] [0:1789] [0:1615] [0:0971]
2-2 1.5770* 1.5841* 1.4704* 0.8927*
(0.3899) (0.3913) (0.4004) (0.4284)
0.3744 0.3760 0.3515 0.2156
2-3 0.8523 0.8564 0.8096 0.8335
(0.4384) (0.4388) (0.4551) (0.4515)
0.2007 0.2018 0.1927 0.2011
2-9 0.7224* 0.7323* 0.7649* 0.6817*
(0.3004) (0.3037) (0.3019) (0.3066)
0.1681 0.1706 0.1813 0.1630
2-12 0.3537 0.3617 0.3454 0.3142
(0.2623) (0.2647) (0.2670) (0.2716)
0.0787 0.0806 0.0784 0.0726
4-4 0.6525 0.6500 0.5386 0.2071
(0.3517) (0.3520) (0.3620) (0.3960)
[0:1509] [0:1503] [0:1253] [0:0472]
6-6 2.7795* 2.7778* 2.756* 1.7490*
(0.4310) (0.4308) (0.4318) (0.4897)
[0:5789] [0:5785] [0:5696] [0:4098]
7-7 1.7334* 1.7245* 1.7480* 1.0480
(0.6953) (0.6961) (0.7090) (0.8193)
[0:4081] [0:4063] [0:4106] [0:2540]
7-13 0.8438* 0.8533* 0.8482* 1.1236*
(0.3126) (0.3154) (0.3185) (0.3256)
[0:1983] [0:2008] [0:2021] [0:2721]
9-9 1.2104* 1.2092* 1.1955* 0.0697
(0.3891) (0.3891) (0.3908) (0.4723)
0.2891 0.2889 0.2876 0.0156
10-8 0.9911 0.9907 0.9564 1.3991
(0.6863) (0.6859) (0.6922) (0.7197)
0.2354 0.2354 0.2294 0.3362
10-10 1.3093* 1.2946* 1.3558* 0.6405
(0.3207) (0.3271) (0.3315) (0.3827)
[0:3126] [ 0:3092] [0:3253] [0:1527]
11-11 0.9765* 0.9800* 0.9991* 0.1726
(0.2104) (0.2109) (0.2133) (0.2463)
[0:2308] [0:2317] [0:2391] [0:0391]
12-12 1.0503* 1.0494* 1.0855* 0.5720*
(0.2094) (0.2095) (0.2152) (0.2406)
[0:2490] [0:2488] [0:2603] [0:1354]
13-13 1.8759* 1.8915* 1.8638* 1.7259*
(0.4588) (0.4642) (0.46289) (0.5271)
[0:4369] [0:4400] [0:4334] [0:4049]
Note: For each variable we present the estimated coe¢ cient, the standard error (in parentheses), and the marginal e⁄ect [in brackets].
* indicates signi￿cance at the 5 % level
30Table A2:Results from conditional logit model. continued
Speci￿cation
1￿ 4￿ 5￿ 6￿
Age di⁄erence (years) -0.2663￿ -0.2662￿ -0.2664￿ -0.2659￿
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0124)





Income gap -0.0240 -0.0738
(0.2213) (0.2308)
[￿0:0052] [￿0:0163]
















Number of "real" couples 2,965 2,965 2,965 2,965
Note: For each variable we present the estimated coe¢ cient, the standard error (in parentheses), and the marginal e⁄ect [in brackets].
* indicates signi￿cance at the 5 % level.





















Minimum distance (km) -0.0376 0.0257
Same institution 0.0364 0.0907
Density 0.0597 0.2254
Married -1.4368* 0.1248
Relationship number 0.2027* 0.0642




Third + 0.4211 0.4227
Age
Female between 15-20 0.1131 0.2397
Female between 21-25 -0.0267 0.2130
Female between 26-30 -0.1732 0.1972
Male between 15-20 0.6606* 0.2074
Male between 21-25 0.2327 0.1723
Male between 26-30 -0.0088 0.1487
Female more than 4 years older 0.4954* 0.2033
Male more than 4 years older 0.4067* 0.1070
Sickness and unemployment
Sickness, female -0.0976 0.1291
Sickness, male -0.1639 0.1602
Unemployment degree, female -0.0247 0.1659
Unemployment degree, male 0.4524* 0.1640
Number of observations 16,169
Log-likelihood 3,359
Note: * denotes signi￿cance at the 5 % level
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